The new technology has enhanced candidates' ability to develop messages that strike a "responsive chord" with voters (Schwartz 1973) . Although the use of image and sound has always been important in campaign advertising (Diamond and Bates 1993) , advances in computer graphics and video techniques have greatly improved the quality (and potential effectiveness) of political spots. In addition, spots can be produced more quickly than in the past, allowing candidates to react rapidly to changes in the political environment. For example, in 1992 the Clinton campaign was able to script, produce, and air a campaign commercial responding to a Bush attack within twenty-four hours.
The effectiveness of political ads has also been enhanced by the increasingly sophisticated use of market research. The combination of opinion polls, focus groups, and audience response technology is a powerful tool in creating ads that raise issues of public concern in ways that are emotionally charged. For example, the Bush campaign strategy of attacking Michael Dukakis's veto of the mandatory pledge of allegiance bill, his opposition to mandatory sentencing for drug offenders, and the Massachusetts prison furlough program emerged from a 1988 focus group. The focus group revealed that although voters did not react very negatively to anyone of these issues, their combination led to serious doubts about Dukakis's leadership ability and political ideology (Kolbert 1992:20) .
Although most focus groups are decidedly low-tech, they are increasingly combined with "continuous on-line audience response" (COAR) technology to gauge participants' emotional responses. COAR systems are the sophisticated stepchildren of the Lazarsfeld-Stanton Program Analyzer, developed in the mid-1940s (Biocca and David 1992) . Advances in computer technology and video graphics have made their use more common (and valuable) in candidate research. Typically, each participant has a small "dial box," on which there is a knob and several settings. The settings correspond to a scale (for example, from strongly dislike to strongly like), with the middle position being neutral. Participants move the dial as they view a video clip or campaign ad, and their second-by-second responses are summarized and plotted on a graph, which is instantly superimposed on a television image of the video or ad. (This graph is not visible to the participants themselves.) Consultants can then determine how the group as a whole or specific types of voters reacted to particular points in the video, using this information to refine the form and content of a candidate's message. This technology was used by both the Clinton and Bush campaigns to gauge voter reactions to Bush's 1992 State of the Union Address (Kolbert 1992:18-20) .
Computer-assisted interview (CATI) systems have also aided in the conduct and analysis of poll data, allowing campaign organizations to track voter reactions to the events of a campaign and to adjust their strategy accordingly. For example, tracking polls were instrumental in the Clinton campaign's decision to delay the airing of their more positive "vision" ads late in the 1992 campaign and to respond directly to the negative ads being aired by the Bush campaign.
Reaching the Voter
At the heart of any campaign is contact with voters. The new technology has refined the ability to do this at both a mass and a more targeted level. As mentioned earlier, 800 and 900 numbers allow candidates to speak "directly" to self-selected voters. These messages often address specific issues and policies deemed of interest to a segment of the public while providing a sense of connection with the candidate as an individual. This connection need not always be positive. For example, during the 1992 presidential campaign, maverick Republican Floyd Brown (creator of the infamous Willie Horton ad) established a 900 number allowing callers to listen to excerpts of conversations between Bill Clinton and his alleged mistress, Gennifer Flowers.
Radio and television talk shows serve a similar purpose to 800 and 900 numbers, allowing voters to talk directly with candidates and their surrogates. Talk shows have the added benefit of being live conversations that can be heard not only by the caller, but also by often sizable viewing and listening audiences. In addition, television talk shows add visual cues to the interaction. As mentioned earlier, the use of caller-recognition systems and data-matching services can provide a wealth of information for developing both mass communications strategies and more targeted approaches to contacting voters.
In recent elections, the logic of telephone contact has been extended to the personal computer. During the 1992 Democratic primaries, Jerry Brown spent an hour at CompuServ headquarters, "chatting" with on-line users (Freedom Forum 1992a: 31) . The Clinton campaign provided information regarding the candidate and his policies through a number of large (CompuServ, Prodigy) and lesser known electronic bulletin boards. Such practices appear to be growing. By late 1995, every major candidate for the Democratic and Republican presidential nominations had established a home page on the World Wide Web.
Computerized contact with voters serves two important functions for candidates. First, it provides detailed information to a small but potentially important and self-motivated group of voters. Second, it provides the campaign with useful, detailed information regarding public attitudes about the candidate and the issues of the day. In theory, other "on-line" behavior of users who contact a candidate (for example, what other bulletin boards and services they use, what screens they look at, what messages they send) can be matched to their political views, allowing campaigns to develop a sophisticated profile of supporters and detractors, as well as a strategy of how best to contact and appeal to them. To date, however, this information has been treated as proprietary by the computer services and has not been shared with candidate organizations.
Candidates have also made increasing use of videocassettes to contact voters. For example, during the 1992 New Hampshire primary, the Clinton campaign distributed thirty thousand videotapes to undecided voters (Arterton 1993 :92) . The tapes, which were delivered door-to-door, featured ten minutes of Clinton talking about his life and views. Ross Perot also made extensive use of videotapes during his independent run for the presidency: more than 300,000 copies of three different tapes, ranging in price from $9.95 to $19.98, were made available to interested citizens (Freedom Forum 1992a:32) .
Satellite feeds provide an additional channel for candidates to reach voters without passing through traditional journalistic filters. Private residences and public facilities equipped with satellite dishes can directly access live or prerecorded messages from the candidates, a technique used by all three candidates during the New technology promises a more democratic exchange of information, but the likelihood of this depends, in part, on who determines what information is available. Decisions as to what kinds of programming will be available on basic, premium, and pay-per-view cable; what data bases and electronic bulletin boards will be accessible through the major on-line services; which books, government documents, wire services, and newspapers will be available electronically; and so forth are critical if the new technology is to fulfill its democratic potential. Particularly important in this regard is the ideological and cultural balance of information that is made available (Bowie 1990; Firestone and Schement 1995) .
Increases in the number of television channels, the expansion of data bases available through on-line services, the proliferation of discussion groups, the ease of setting up home pages, and so forth may make the issue of control less serious over time. However, the market-as opposed to civic-forces driving the new technology may work against the growth in accessible, relevant, and balanced political information.
Access
The new technology introduces substantial financial and informational costs. Because institutions and individuals vary in their ability to pay these costs, serious questions arise regarding the extent to which campaign information, and thus election outcomes, will be determined less by the issues and more by the relative abilities of interest groups, campaign organizations, and news outlets to use the new media. In addition, socioeconomic differences in the use of new technology, if not systematically addressed, raise the specter of a bifurcated electorate of information haves and have-nots.
Declines in the financial cost of new technology suggest that current disparities in elite and public access may be a temporary aberration. However, it is unclear whether computers, modems, and the like will ever become as universal as the television and telephone. In addition, the new technology, unlike media such as broadcast television, allow for a range of uses that vary in the skill and finances required to use them, making the simple presence of the requisite hardware in a campaign office, journalist's hands, or the home a relatively poor indicator of equal access. The pace at which new applications and technologies develop raises the real possibility that inequitable access to information may become a permanent condition of modern society.
Education versus Manipulation
The new technology provides a public space in which complex, shifting, often contradictory views can be discussed. It also provides access to facts and opinions that can be used to tether these discussions to the material world, giving the citizenry a common pool of information from which to draw. However, the new technology also reveals our wants, desires, beliefs, and prejudices in ways that make us subject to unprecedented manipulation. Campaign organizations, special interest groups, and media outlets can and do use this information to appeal to, reinforce, and even create these wants, desires, and prejudices.
Although the sheer number of information sources helps guard against this kind of manipulation, this increase, coupled with the refined ability of campaign organizations and the news media to target audiences with carefully crafted messages, raises the possibility of an informationally segregated citizenry in which different groups come to view the political world in starkly different terms. Although evidence suggests that fears about the fragmentation of the public are overstated (Neuman 1991; Times Mirror 1994 , 1995 , the future of the mass audience is by no means clear.
In the end, the new technology, in and of itself, will be neither a cure for the shortcomings of electoral politics in America nor the cause for the exacerbation of these shortcomings. A close examination of how the new technology has been used to date suggests that democracy requires not only the right to information and expression and the means to exercise that right, but also the will to use those means for civically appropriate ends.
Notes

